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Abstract 
Truck-only lanes and tollways have been promoted as a way to combat road congestion, enhance 
safety and reduce pavement damage. This paper explores one aspect of truck lanes by 
considering whether there are advantages in separating cars and trucks. The benefits of vehicle 
separation are found to depend on several factors: the relative volumes of cars and trucks, the 
congestion delay and safety hazards that each type of vehicle imposes, values of travel time for 
cars and trucks, and lane capacity indivisibilities. The optimal assignment of vehicles to lanes 
can be supported using tolls that are differentiated by vehicle type and route. By contrast, lane 
access restrictions generally cannot support the optimum and may provide no benefit at all. 
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 1  INTRODUCTION 
The merits of separating cars and trucks have been debated since the early days of motoring. 
Recent proposals in the US have focused on establishing truck-only lanes and truck tollways.
1 
Although no such facilities have yet been built
2 several US states have conducted studies (see 
Federal Highway Administration, 2003; Transportation Research Board, 2003; Hedlund, 2004). 
The Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG) has a plan that calls for an 
interconnected system of truck-only freeway lanes on four highways that would cost nearly $10 
billion. Truck-only lanes were proposed for a North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) 
highway between Toronto and Laredo, Texas. The Reason Foundation published a detailed study 
(Samuel et al., 2002) arguing that an interstate network of private truck tollways could be 
profitable. More recently, it has formulated a proposal to expand highway capacity in Atlanta 
with a toll truckway system as one component (Poole, 2006). And Texas has adopted an 
ambitious plan to build a “Trans Texas Corridor” (Texas Department of Transportation, 2002).
3
 
Several potential advantages of dedicated truck-only facilities have been identified in the 
literature. 
 
Road design: Trucks require higher road-design standards than do light vehicles as far as 
pavement thickness, lane widths, road curvature, grades, etc.  By restricting trucks to a subset 
of roads or lanes, the rest of the road network can be built to a lower standard and hence more 
cheaply (Holguin-Veras et al., 2003). 
 
Congestion: Trucks and light vehicles alike may gain from reductions in congestion. If trucks 
experience reduced traffic volumes on truck-only facilities they will incur less congestion 
delay and less frequent need for braking, accelerating, and overtaking. Travel time for freight 
deliveries may also become more predictable (Douglas 2005). Light vehicles may benefit 
from fewer delays due to slow-moving trucks (Verhoef et al., 1999; Rouwendal et al., 2002) 
and less interference in fields of vision and changing lanes (Pitfield and Watson, 2001). 
 
Safety: Although the empirical evidence is not clear-cut, it appears that accident rates are higher 
in mixed (i.e. heavy and light vehicle) traffic than in homogeneous traffic (Middleton and 
Lord, 2005; Forkenbrock and March, 2005). One reason is lane switching (Pitfield and 
                                                 
1 Reich et al. (2002) provide an extensive literature review. 
2 Two facilities in the US are designed to accommodate trucks while also permitting passenger vehicles to 
use them. One is the New Jersey Turnpike, and the other is a segment of Interstate 5 north of Los Angeles 
(Middleton and Venglar, 2006). The New Jersey Turnpike is a so-called “dual-dual” roadway, defined to 
be “a system of parallel, grade-separated lanes with trucks restricted from operating in the center, auto-
only lanes.” (Fischer et al., 2003, p.74) 
3 The Trans Texas Corridor will consist of a 4,000-mile network of corridors up to 1,200 feet wide with 
three road lanes in each direction for passenger vehicles, and two road lanes in each direction for trucks. 
Road tollways will be designed for an 80 mph speed limit. In addition, the corridors will have one rail 
track in each direction for each of three types of rail service (freight, commuter rail, and high-speed 
passenger rail) as well as corridors for utilities. The first Trans Texas Corridor segment, TTC-35, is under 
development. Watson, 2001). If so, safety is promoted by segregating trucks from cars. And surveys 
indicate that automobile drivers dislike trucks and would be willing to pay to avoid them.
4
 
Air quality: By supporting higher and less variable speeds, truck-only facilities contribute to 
better overall air quality (Douglas, 2005). 
 
Noise: Reductions in noise are a potential benefit if truck facilities are located away from densely 
populated areas (Douglas, 2005). 
 
Truck type: Truck-only facilities would facilitate use of so-called Long Combination Vehicles 
(LCVs) that exploit economies of vehicle size.
5 Use of larger trucks reduces not only 
transport costs per tonne-km, but also congestion delays for a given amount of freight 
transported because fewer trucks are on the road. 
 
Truck-only facilities are also recognized to have several potential disadvantages. 
 
Capacity indivisibilities: Building truck-only facilities is cost-effective only if truck volumes are 
sufficiently high (OECD, 1992; Douglas, 2005; Forkenbrock and March, 2005). Lane 
capacity indivisibilities make it difficult to allocate capacity between vehicle categories in 
efficient proportions (Small, 1983; Dahlgren, 1998, 2002; Yang and Huang, 1999; Parsons et 
al., 2005). And to facilitate access in the event of incidents, as well as to provide reliable 
travel times for truckers, twin truck lanes are required (Fischer et al., 2003) which increases 
the infrastructure costs. Wilbur Smith Associates (2003) assessed various strategies for 
dealing with congestion on Interstate 10 (I-10), which runs across the southern US from 
Florida to California. The study concluded that simply adding more general-purpose lanes to 
I-10 would be more effective than adding truck-only lanes. Various other studies have 
reached similar conclusions. 
 
Availability of right-of-way: Some US intercity travel corridors lack sufficient width to 
accommodate double truck lanes throughout their length (Poole and Samuel, 2004). And 
many Interstate highways lack an uninterrupted median that would permit an extra lane or 
lanes to be built in the median (Reich et al., 2002). 
 
Lane access considerations: Complete segregation of heavy vehicles from cars is generally not 
practical.
6 Truck route restrictions may add to travel distance which militates against using 
                                                 
4 Using contingent valuation analysis Bambe and McMullen (1996) estimated that motorists would be 
willing to pay about $35 (1995) annually to remove triple-trailer combination trucks from Oregon's 
highways. (Information taken from Forkenbrock and March, 2005, p. 8.) However, while automobile 
drivers generally perceive improvements in safety and operations from lane restrictions on heavy 
vehicles, truck drivers do not foresee improvements (Koehne et al., 1996; Douglas, 2005). 
5 Samuel et al. (2002) estimate that permitting the largest LCVs could increase productivity by $3.04 per 
vehicle-mile. 
6 As Wilbur Smith Associates (2003, p.35) remarks: “Even in cases where truck separation is applied, 
there will have to be some degree of car/truck interaction, especially along segments where local traffic 
merges on/off the freeway system. This presents significant traffic engineering issues (trucks and cars 
crossing lanes to merge to and from exclusive lanes).” 
  2them for short-haul trips. And forcing vehicles to use certain lanes may increase the number 
of lane changes (e.g. if trucks are restricted to left-hand lanes) which contributes to traffic 
flow turbulence and accident hazards (Pitfield and Watson, 2001; Gan and Jo, 2003). 
 
Temporal segregation: Truckers generally try to avoid traveling during peak commuting periods 
(Donaghy and Schintler, 1998; Fischer et al., 2003). A majority of their trips are made during 
mid-day (10:00-15:00) and at night. To the extent that autos and trucks can use the same 
roads at different times, building separate facilities is unnecessary to separate them. 
 
These lists of pros and cons indicate that both the optimal design and the cost-effectiveness of 
truck facilities depend on many practical considerations. A large number of facility types have 
been proposed that differ according to numbers of lanes, conversions vs. additions – including 
conversion of High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes, and admitting trucks to High Occupancy 
Toll (HOT) lanes, and usage restrictions. No formal analytical/economic analysis of truck-only 
facilities has been conducted to date. Nevertheless, the economics of truck-only facilities 
resemble in several respects the economics of HOV and HOT lanes which have been studied 
from an economic perspective. For example, Small (1977, 1983) analyzes whether HOV lanes 
for buses are cost effective, and how well they perform relative to congestion tolls. He finds that 
with ideal lane segregation of buses and cars (i.e. when capacity is perfectly divisible), bus 
priority lanes yield about half the benefits of marginal cost pricing. But when the indivisibility of 
HOV lanes is accounted for, auto congestion becomes dramatically worse because a full lane has 
to be allocated to HOV traffic. Only at high volumes of passengers per lane-hour do the positive 
benefits for HOV lane users outweigh the negative effects of increased delay for travelers using 
the remaining lanes. Mannering and Hamed (1990) obtain similar results for HOV lanes 
designed for cars rather than buses.  
 
These and other studies convey two important lessons that carry over to truck-only facilities. One 
is that the benefits from dedicated facilities depend critically on the volume of traffic that will 
use them. The second lesson is that lane- or route-access restrictions are second-best policies 
compared to efficient pricing.
7
 
This paper focuses on one aspect of the economics of truck-only facilities: how existing road 
space should be allocated between cars and trucks. This question has been partially addressed by 
Berglas et al. (1984) and Arnott et al. (1992) inter alios, and the model developed in Arnott et al. 
(1992) is adopted and extended here. Section 2 describes the general model and derives some 
results concerning traffic allocation in the unregulated user equilibrium and the social/system 
optimum. Section 3 develops a specific version of the general model for the numerical examples 
that are presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the main findings and identifies 
various directions in which the analysis could be extended. 
 
                                                 
7 This lesson clearly emerges in Mohring (1979). 
  32  THE GENERAL MODEL 
2.1  Model specification 
The general model is adopted from Arnott et al. (1992). There are two routes or sets of traffic 
lanes indexed by r, r=1,2. And there are two types of vehicles, indexed by g, g=L,H, where 
subscripts L and H refer respectively to light vehicles (henceforth Lights) and heavy vehicles 
(henceforth Heavies).
 8 The number of trips by Lights is  , and the number of trips by Heavies 
is 
L N
H N .   and  L N H N  are fixed; that is independent of the cost of a trip. Trips on the two routes are 
perfect substitutes. Let   denote the number of trips by type g on route r. Since trips must 
be made by one route or the other 
0 gr N ≥
12,, gg g NNN  g L H + == . The cost incurred by type g for a 
trip on route r is a linear
9 increasing function of the number of vehicles of each type that take the 
same route:  
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Formulae (1a,1b) incorporate the convention that a superscript denotes the user type that incurs 
the cost, and a subscript denotes the type that imposes the cost. Term (1) in each expression 
comprises costs, 
g
r F , that are independent of usage. These costs include vehicle operating costs, 
free-flow travel time costs, and the portion of single-vehicle accident costs that is borne by the 
individual users. Term (2) is the cost imposed by Lights that use the same route. Term (3) is the 
analogous cost imposed by Heavies. Following Arnott et al. (1992) the coefficients 
L
Lr c  and 
H
Hr c , 
r = 1, 2, are called own-cost coefficients since they describe the costs imposed on users of the 
same type. Analogously, the coefficients 
L
Hr c  and 
H
Lr c , r = 1, 2, are called cross-cost coefficients. 
Finally, term (4) is the toll, 
g
r τ . It is assumed that tolls can be differentiated by vehicle type and 
route – as is general practice on existing tolled facilities. 
                                                 
8 With two discrete types it is necessary to contend with a number of possible type-to-route allocations 
(Arnott et al., 1992; Small and Yan, 2001). This complication could be avoided by using a model with a 
continuum of types (e.g. as in Verhoef and Small, 2004). The discrete typology is adopted here for two 
reasons. First, it is suitable for a study of truck toll lanes in which there is a natural dichotomy of types. 
Second, Heavies differ from Lights not only in size and maneuverability, but also in terms of accident 
frequencies and costs, emissions, road damage costs, values of time and other characteristics. 
Constructing an empirically accurate and tractable joint frequency distribution of these dimensions would 
be a challenge, and it would make analytical results difficult to derive. 
9 Linear functions are chosen for tractability. Most road traffic studies assume that travel time (and travel 
time cost) is a strictly convex function of usage. These functions are typically specified in terms of 
instantaneous flows. When specified in terms of trips the functional relationship can be approximately 
linear. In the case of Vickrey’s bottleneck queuing model with identical travelers and linear schedule 
delay cost functions, the relationship is exactly linear; see Arnott et al. (1998) and Small and Verhoef 
(2006, Chapter 3). 
  42.2  User equilibrium 
In the absence of tolls or access restrictions, three types of user equilibrium (UE) route 
allocations are possible (Arnott et al., 1992; Small and Yan, 2001): integrated equilibria, partially 
separated equilibria and segregated equilibria. In an integrated equilibrium both Lights and 
Heavies use each route. In a partially separated equilibrium, one type uses both routes and the 
other type uses only one route. Finally, in a segregated equilibrium each type uses only one 
route. 
 
If type g uses both routes then, by Wardrop’s first principle, the costs for type g must be equal on 
the two routes: 
 
12 , ,
gg CC g L H == .                                                          (2) 
 
The necessary and sufficient conditions for an integrated UE are therefore: 
 
12
L L CC = ,                                                                (3a) 
12
H H CC = ,                                                               (3b) 
12 1 2 0, 0, 0, 0 LLHH NNNN >>>>
)
.                                           (4) 
 
Substitution of (1a) into (3a), and (1b) into (3b), yields a pair of linear reaction functions of the 
form   and  ( 11
L
LH Nf N = ( ) 1
H
H N 1 L f N = . By the usual stability criterion an integrated UE can 
exist only if ( )( ) 1 1
LH
HL fN fN ∂∂ ∂∂ < 1 . Given eqns. (1a) and (1b) the stability condition works 
out to 
 
() ( ) ( )( ) 1 212 12 1 2
LLHH L L HH
LLHH HHLL cccc cccc ++ > ++ , 
or 
L HL H
L HH cc cc L • •• > • ,                                                              (5) 
 
where  . Stability requires that the product of the own-cost 
coefficients on the two routes be larger than the product of the cross-cost coefficients. One might 
expect Condition (5) to hold if the inequality holds separately on each route; i.e. if: 
12 , , , ,
gg g
hh h ccc g L H h L H • ≡+ = =
 
L HL H
LrH r H rL r cc cc > , r=1,2.                                                        (6) 
 
In fact, the two conditions in (6) are neither necessary nor sufficient for (5) as is shown in 
Appendix A with a generic algebraic proof. This is because stability is a property of pairs of 
routes rather than routes in isolation. However, the two conditions in (6) do imply Condition (5) 
(see Appendix A) if the routes satisfy a similarity property
10: 
 
                                                 
10 This term is introduced in Arnott et al. (1992, §2.1). 
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The similarity property holds if the cost coefficients are inversely proportional to route 
capacities; i.e. have the functional form 
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where   is the flow capacity of Route r and the  r s
g
h γ  parameters are independent of r. 
 
It is important to note that Condition (5) is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for an 
integrated UE. In addition, the nonnegativity conditions (4) must be satisfied. As Arnott et al. 
(1992, pp. 83-84) explain, there are four cases to consider in all: 
 
1.  Stability and nonnegativity conditions satisfied. In this case there is a unique integrated 
UE. 
2.  Stability condition satisfied, but nonnegativity conditions violated. There is a unique UE 
that is either partially separated or segregated. 
3.  Nonnegativity conditions satisfied, but stability condition violated. There are two stable 
UE, each of which is either partially separated or segregated. 
4.  Stability and nonnegativity conditions violated. There is a unique UE that is either 
partially separated or segregated. 
2.3  The social or system optimum 
Following usual practice, welfare will be measured by social surplus. Since travel demand is 
assumed fixed, welfare can be measured by the negative of total social costs, TSC. Let  gr e  denote 
the external cost of a trip by type g on route r that is not borne by users of the route collectively. 
Parameter  gr e  includes the costs of emissions, noise and pavement damage; for brevity it will be 
called the environmental cost. Since tolls are a transfer from users to the toll-road authority, toll 
revenues net out of social costs and TSC is given by the formula 
 
( ) ( ) 1,2
LL L HH H
r Lr Lr Hr Hr Lr Lr r Lr Lr Hr Hr Hr Hr r TSC F c N c N e N F c N c N e N
= = +++ + +++ ∑ .      (8) 
 
The social optimum (SO) achieves a minimum of TSC. Similar to the UE, the SO may entail 
integration, partial separation or segregation. For integration to be optimal the second-order 
condition for an interior cost minimum (see Appendix B) must be satisfied. This condition is 
stated as: 
 






LH L H L H
LH HL H L cc cc c c •• • • • • >+− ) .                                              (9) 
  6 
In an integrated SO the marginal social cost of a trip is equal across routes for both types. Let –g 
be the index for the type other than g; i.e. if g=L then  gH − = , and if g=H then  . The 
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∂
.                            (10) 
 
A necessary condition for type g to use both routes at the SO is that the marginal social costs are 
equal on the two routes: 
 
12 , ,
gg MSC MSC g L H == .                                                    (11) 
 
Condition (11) is the counterpart to Condition (2) for the UE.  
2.4  Comparison of the user equilibrium and system optimum  
Despite the simple linear structure of the model, it is not trivial to compare the UE and SO. The 
general formulae for the route allocations are unwieldy, and the route allocation patterns of the 
UE and SO may differ. The procedure followed here is to compare the stability and second-order 
conditions for an integrated equilibrium, and then compare the traffic allocations in the UE and 
SO under some simplifying, but plausible, assumptions about trip costs on the two routes. 
 
The second-order condition for an integrated SO given in Lemma 1 (inequality (9)) is more 
stringent than the stability condition for the UE (inequality (5)) unless 
L H
H L cc • • =  ; i.e. unless the 
cross-cost coefficients (summed over the two routes) are equal for Lights and Heavies. 
Consequently, the UE may be integrated, but the SO partially separated or segregated. This result 
is formalized as: 
 
Proposition 1: The stability condition for an interior UE is satisfied if, but not only if, the 
second-order condition for an interior SO is satisfied. Consequently, it may be optimal to 
partially separate or segregate Light and Heavy vehicles even if they are integrated in the 
unregulated user equilibrium. 
 
To understand Proposition 1, note that the second-order condition can be violated when the 
stability condition is met if the quadratic term in 
L H
HL cc • • −
 
on the right-hand side of condition 
(9) is appreciable. This will be the case if the cross-cost coefficients are very different. Suppose, 
for example, that Heavies severely delay or endanger Lights so that 
L H
H L cc • • >> . If so, it is optimal 
to keep Heavies away from Lights to avoid this interference. Suppose, alternatively, that Heavies 
have a much higher value of time than Lights so that 
H L
L H cc • • >> . If so, it is desirable to provide 
Heavies with a high-quality service by giving them exclusive access to one of the routes. In 
either case integration may occur in the UE when separation is more efficient. 
 
To compare traffic allocations in the UE and SO it is useful to rewrite eqn. (10): 
  7 
() () () ()
{
1 4 23
, , ,  1 ,2
gg g g g
rr r g r g r g r g r g r MSC C c N c N e g L H r τ
−
− =− + + + = = 1 4 24 3 1 2 31 424 3
.                          (12) 
 
Term (1) in eqn. (12) is the private cost net of toll borne by a user of type g on route r as given in 
eqn. (1). Term (2) is the external cost imposed on users of the same type on route r, and Term (3) 
is the external cost imposed on users of the other type. Finally, Term (4) is the environmental 
cost imposed on non-users. Terms (2-4) all correspond to externalities, and hence are a potential 
source of inefficiency in the UE. 
 
The influence of the environmental externality is transparent. If the environmental cost of a trip 
is higher, say, for Lights on Route 1 than on Route 2, then usage of Route 1 by Lights will tend to 
be excessive in the UE. The fixed costs of a trip,
g
r F , contribute to the private cost of a trip (Term 
(1) in eqn. (12)) but not to the external costs. Consequently, users place undue weight on fixed 




If environmental costs and fixed costs are the same on the two routes for each user type, then 
these two potential sources of inefficiency will be absent. However, the external costs in Terms 
(2) and (3) of eqn. (12) will still not balance out without a further assumption. A sufficient 
assumption is that the similarity property, (7), holds. This is formalized in the following 
proposition: 
 
Proposition 2: Assume that the second-order condition (9) holds and the following three 
assumptions are satisfied: 
 
Assumption 1: Free-flow travel costs are the same on the two routes:  .  12 ,,
gg FF  g L H ==
Assumption 2: Environmental costs are the same on the two routes:  .  12 ,, gg ee  g L H ==
Assumption 3: Property (7) holds. 
 
Then the UE and SO are both integrated with identical numbers of each type using each 
route. 
 
Proposition 2 is proved in Appendix C. 
 
2.5  Intervention 
Unless the assumptions of Proposition 2 are satisfied, the unregulated equilibrium will generally 
not be optimal. As §2.5.1 below explains, a first-best optimum can be supported using tolls. Lane 
access restrictions clearly can support the optimum if it is segregated, but clearly not if it is 
                                                 
11 This bias is well-known in the literature on two parallel routes with homogeneous travelers; see Barro 
and Romer (1987) and Verhoef et al. (1996) inter alios. 
  8integrated. As §2.5.2 demonstrates, lane access restrictions also generally fail to sustain a social 
optimum if it is partially separated. 
2.5.1  Tolls 
The social optimum can be decentralized using suitably differentiated tolls. This is formalized in: 
 
Proposition 3: The system optimum can be decentralized using tolls that are differentiated 
by user type and route. 
 
Proposition 3 is proved in Appendix D. Because travel demand is assumed to be inelastic, the 
allocations of users across routes depend only on the differences in tolls between routes. 
Consequently, it is enough to toll the route with the higher optimal toll and leave the other route 
toll-free. However, care is required in setting toll levels. If the system optimum is integrated, 
then the second-order condition and stability conditions are satisfied and the tolled equilibrium is 
stable. But if the system optimum is partially separated or segregated, the stability condition may 
not hold. And if it does not hold the tolled equilibrium is unstable. As Appendix D explains, this 
problem can be circumvented by setting a sufficiently high toll on the route that a user type is not 
supposed to use. 
2.5.2  Lane access restrictions 
If the SO is partially separated or segregated the question arises whether it can be supported by 
lane-access restrictions alone without resorting to tolls. A segregated optimum clearly can be 
sustained simply by restricting each user type to its designated route. However, if the SO is 
partially separated it generally cannot be sustained with lane-access restrictions alone. Indeed, if 
the UE is integrated, then restricting one user type to one route can actually be welfare-reducing 
under the conditions identified in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 4: Assume that the stability condition (5) holds and Assumptions 1-3 of 
Proposition 2 are satisfied. Then, even if the SO is partially separated or segregated, 
restricting one user type raises total social costs if the other user type uses both routes. 
 
Proposition 4 can be proved with routine algebra. An intuitive explanation for this rather 
surprising result can be offered by comparing UE and SO usage in the same partially separated 
configuration. Consider the case in which Lights use both routes while Heavies are restricted to 




L LH NNcc L • • − ∝− .                                                      (13) 
 
Expression (13) indicates that the no-toll equilibrium route split of Lights (who use both routes) 
is not optimal unless 
L H
H L cc • = • ; that is unless the external cost that Lights incur from Heavies 
matches the external cost that Lights impose on Heavies. If 
L H
H L cc • • > , then Lights try too hard to 
avoid Heavies and too many Lights use Route 1. Correspondingly, if 
L H
H L cc • • < , then too few 
Lights use Route 1. The larger the absolute difference between 
L
H c •  and 
H
L c • , the greater is the 
  9distortion in route split. 
 
Now observe that partial separation of types is desirable only if the second-order condition is 
violated; i.e.  (
2 1
4
LH L H L H
LH HL H L cc cc c c •• • • • • <+− ) .  Since the stability condition, 
L HL H
L HH cc cc •• • • > L , is 
satisfied by assumption, this requires that  0
LH
HL cc •• − > . The larger is 
L H
HL cc •• − , the larger is 
the potential benefit from restriction, but the larger also is the distortion in the route split of 
Lights as just explained. It turns out that the distortion always outweighs the potential benefit, so 
that restriction is never optimal without tolls. This is the case regardless of which user type is 
restricted, or to which route, as long as the lane access constraint results in a partially separated 
equilibrium rather than a segregated equilibrium. Naturally, if tolls can be levied then the route 
split of the unrestricted group can be optimized, and restriction will be welfare-enhancing 
whenever the second-order condition is violated. (However, as Proposition 3 establishes, lane 
access restrictions are redundant if tolls can be freely imposed.) 
 
To compare the UE and SO further, and to get an idea of the magnitude of the potential welfare 
differences, a specific version of the general model that focuses on congestion and accident 
externalities is developed in the next section. 
 
3  THE SPECIFIC MODEL 
3.1  Model specification 
The general model features own-cost and cross-cost coefficients without specifying their 
underlying determinants. Congestion and accidents are the two main road transport costs that are 
external to individual users (partially in the case of accidents), but internal to users in aggregate. 
To permit separate roles for the congestion and accident externalities the cost coefficients are 
now written: 
 
,  ,;  ,;   1 , 2
gg g




hr cong  and 
g
hr acc  are congestion and accident cost coefficients respectively. Define  
 
12 , , ; ,
gg g
hh h cong cong cong g L H h L H • ≡+ = = , 
and 
12 , , ; ,
gg g
hh h acc acc acc g L H h L H • ≡+ = =. 
 
The stability condition (5) can then be written 
 
() ( ) ( )( )
LL HH L L H
LL HH HH L cong acc cong acc cong acc cong acc •• • • • • • ++ > ++
H
L • .               (14) 
 
By reasoning parallel to that in Section 2.2, one might expect Condition (14) to be satisfied if it 
holds for the congestion and accident coefficients separately; i.e. if: 
  10 
L HL H
L HH cong cong cong congL • •• > • ,                                             (15a) 
and  
L HL H
L HH acc acc acc accL • •• > • .                                                  (15b) 
 
But for the same reason as for the route decomposition in equations (5) and (6), Conditions (15a) 
and (15b) are neither necessary nor sufficient for stability. (See Appendix A for the generic 
proof.) Whether or not the stability condition (14) holds depends in part on the relative 
magnitudes of the own-cost and cross-cost coefficients. These are considered in the following 
two subsections. 
3.2  Relative congestion costs 
For several reasons Heavies have a greater impact than Lights on highway congestion: they 
occupy more road space, they take longer to accelerate and decelerate, and they obscure visibility 
more. These differences are usually accounted for by using a Passenger Car Equivalent (PCE) 
factor (Transportation Research Board, 2000). Typical PCE values are 1.5-2 for buses and 
single-unit trucks, and 2-3 for combination vehicles. It is common practice to adjust the PCE 
factor upwards with the percentage grade and the fraction of road length that is hilly (Middleton 
and Lord, 2005). And some studies have found that the PCE factor is an increasing function of 
the fraction of Heavies in the traffic stream (e.g. Janson and Rathi, 1991; Yun et al., 2005): a 
consideration that cannot be assimilated with the linear functions in (1a,1b). 
 
The PCE factor measures the average impedance created by larger vehicles, but not their 
impedance of individual vehicle types as embodied in the own- and cross-congestion coefficients 
in eqns. (1a,1b). These individual effects have not been extensively studied although Kockelman 
and Shabih (2000) have estimated the relative delays imposed by light trucks and by cars. To 
provide some flexibility in the specification, let   be a generic PCE factor for Heavies and 
suppose that the relative magnitudes of the congestion-cost parameters 
cong PCE
L
Hr cong  and 
L
Lr cong  are 










λ == .                                            (16a) 
Parameter   in eqn. (16a) is a scale factor to account for the possibility that – perhaps 
because of their lower speed and maneuverability, and greater height –  Heavies impose a 
disproportionately large delay on Lights. The costs of congestion delay are proportional to the 




g v  denote the value of time 
for type g,  . If a Light is assumed to impose the same congestion delay on a Heavy as 
on another Light then the relative magnitudes of parameters 
, gL H =
H
Lr cong  and 
L









== .                                                  (16b) 
 
  11Finally, if is assumed that the standard PCE for congestion is applicable to the delay that Heavies 
impose on each other, then the relative magnitudes of parameters 
H
Hr cong  and 
L










== .                                           (16c) 
 
3.3  Relative accident costs 
Relative accident costs are treated in the same way as relative congestion costs. Let   be a 
generic Passenger Car Equivalent for Heavies that measures the expected accident cost imposed 
by a Heavy as a multiple of the cost imposed by a Light. And let parameter   be a scale 






12 The relative magnitudes of parameters 
L
Hr acc  and 
L










φ == .                                            (17a) 
Let 
H μ  denote the cost borne by a Heavy in an accident with a Light as a multiple of the cost 









μ == .                                                  (17b) 
The empirical magnitude of 
H μ  is not obvious. On the one hand a Heavy vehicle and its driver 
may suffer little damage or injury in a collision with a Light vehicle. On the other hand the value 
of the vehicle and cargo at risk is often much greater for a Heavy, and the opportunity cost of 
time spent dealing with an accident is also likely to be higher. Finally, if the factors 
L
H φ  and 











μ == .                                           (17c) 
3.4  Implications for the stability condition 
As noted in Section 3.1 it is not possible to check the stability condition (14) by examining the 
congestion-cost and accident-cost coefficient conditions, (15a, 15b), independently. But an 
examination of the two conditions is nevertheless instructive. Given the relative congestion cost 
coefficients in (16) and (17), 
 
   1
s
L HL H L
L HH L cong cong cong cong H λ •• • • − =−  , 
                                                 
12 The scale factor 
L
H φ can include unreasonable “fear” of Heavies to the extent that the fear creates a real 
psychological cost or distress for drivers of Light vehicles. 
  12and  
   1
s
L HL H L




= means identical in sign. Congestion therefore tends to be destabilizing of an integrated 
equilibrium if  ; i.e. if Heavies impede Lights more than what is indicated by the standard 
PCE factor. Similarly, accident costs tend to be destabilizing if  ; i.e. if Heavies impose a 








Note that the magnitudes of the Passenger Car Equivalent factors,   and  , and the 
values of time, 
cong PCE acc PCE
L v  and  , do not affect whether Conditions (15a, 15b) are satisfied. What does 
matter are the relative magnitudes of the own-cost and cross-cost coefficients. 
H v
 
4  NUMERICAL EXAMPLES 
4.1  Parameterization 
The travel corridor featured in the numerical examples is intended to be representative of 
limited-access highways – which serve most of the medium-to-long urban truck trips in the US. 
Base-case parameter values are listed in Table 1. 
4.1.1  Routes 
The corridor has three traffic lanes in each direction. Consideration is limited to one direction. 
Route 1 comprises two lanes with an aggregate capacity of 4,000 (standard) PCEs per hour, and 
Route 2 comprises one lane with a capacity of 2,000 (standard) PCEs per hour. Free-flow travel 
speed on each route is 65 mph. Both routes are 32.5 miles long so that free-flow travel time is 30 
mins. 
4.1.2  Travel demand 
Total trip demand,  , is fixed at 40,000 trips per day. The proportion of Heavies, 
, is varied parametrically from 0% to 100%.
L NN N ≡+ H
                                                
/ H NN
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4.1.3  Volume-independent user costs 
Numerous studies have estimated the VOT for automobile travel. Small and Verhoef (2006, p. 3-
56) identify a typical VOT for work trips of $9.14/h for US metropolitan areas in 2003. Some 
recent studies assume rather higher values. For heavy vehicles a wide range of VOT have been 
estimated or assumed – in part because VOT depends on the type of vehicle and its load, drivers’ 
wage rates, the importance of punctual delivery, whether the truck is operated in-house or for-
hire, and other factors (De Jong, 2000; Kawamura, 2003). Wilbur Smith Associates (2003) 
 
13 Typical truck percentages are 20% or lower, but it is instructive to consider the full potential range. 
  13assumes a VOT of $25/h for trucks while acknowledging that this is a very conservative value. 
According to Forkenbrock and March (2005, p.7): 
 
“The value of time used by FHWA is $25.24 per vehicle-hour for large trucks, compared 
to $15.71 for small cars. In other studies in the United States and Europe, estimated 
values of time for trucking range as high as $193.80, with a median value among the 
studies of $40 and a mean of $51.80. The value of reliability (that is, the cost of 
unexpected delay) is another 50 to 250 percent higher than these values of time.” 
 
These figures suggest that the average VOT for Heavies is several times the average VOT for 
Lights. For the base-case values it is assumed that 
L v =$12/h and 
H v =$50/h. 
4.1.4  Congestion cost coefficients 
Based on information in FHWA (1997), Parry (2006, Table 1) assumes a PCE for congestion of 
1.9 for single-unit trucks and 2.2 for combination trucks. The value for   of 2.0 used here 
is an (approximate) weighted average for the two truck types. The Light-Light congestion cost 
parameters,  , are chosen so that the marginal external congestion cost of a Light 




Lr cong r =
1
L
H λ =  is chosen as a 
benchmark; it is quite plausible that 
L
H λ  exceeds one and this is explored in the sensitivity 
analysis. 
4.1.5  Accident cost coefficients 
Based on information in FHWA (1997), Parry (2006, Table 1) assumes external accident costs of 
$0.020/mile for Lights and $0.015/mile for Heavies. Given widespread concern about truck 
accidents, and the perceived dangers that trucks impose on light vehicles, the relatively small 
value for Heavies is surprising. One possible explanation is that truck drivers are better drivers 
on average than automobile drivers, and less prone to causing accidents.
14 The Light-Light 
accident cost parameters,  , are chosen so that the marginal external accident cost of 
a Light is about $0.020/mile on each route in the base case. As for parameter 
, 1 ,2
L
Lr acc r =
L
H λ , the value of 
 is chosen as a benchmark and larger values are considered in the sensitivity analysis.  1
L
H φ =
4.1.6  External costs 
Road damage, local pollution, global pollution and noise costs are included in the environmental 
cost parameters,  gr e . All are assumed to be proportional to distance. Parry (2006, Table 1) 
reports pollution costs per gallon. The values in Table 1 are converted to costs per mile by 
dividing by Parry’s assumed values for vehicle fuel economy. 
 
                                                 
14 Consistent with this view, Forkenbrock and March (2005, p.6) write: “According to FHWA [Federal 
Highway Administration], in 71 percent of two-vehicle fatal crashes involving a large truck and another 
vehicle, police reported ‘one or more errors or other factors’ related to the behavior of the passenger 
vehicle driver and none for the truck driver.” Similar statistics are reported in US DOT (2006). 
  144.2  Results 
4.2.1  Base case 
With the base-case parameter values, the second-order condition holds and both the UE and the 
SO are integrated. Lights and Heavies both split 2:1 between Route 1 and Route 2 in proportion 
to the route capacities. The second-order condition holds as a strict inequality despite the fact 
that Conditions (15a) and (15b) for the congestion-cost and accident-cost coefficients are 
violated (the left-hand and right-hand sides of each condition are equal). The reason for this is 
that relative to Heavies, Lights inflict more accident than congestion costs, whereas relative to 
Lights, Heavies are more averse to congestion than to accidents. Consequently, it is efficient for 
Heavies to travel with Lights and for Lights to travel with Heavies. Since Assumptions 1-3 in 
Proposition 2 are all satisfied, the UE and SO coincide and nothing can be gained from either 
tolling or lane access restrictions.
15
4.2.2  Sensitivity analysis with variations in the traffic mix 
Some parameter values, such as the average VOT for trucks, vary widely from location to 
location. There is also appreciable uncertainty about the values of other parameters such as the 
scale parameters, 
L
H λ  and 
L
H φ , and the relative cost of accidents for heavy vehicles, 
H μ . 
Sensitivity analysis is therefore warranted. Table 2 summarizes the results for four parameters or 
sets of parameters: (a) VOT for heavy vehicles, (b) congestion-cost parameters, (c) accident-cost 
parameters, and (d) route characteristics. 
 
(a) Value of time for heavy vehicles 
 
The base-case VOT for Heavies is 
H v =$50/h. In Variant 1 (see Table 2) this is reduced to just 
$15/h. The stability condition is still satisfied, but the second-order condition is violated. 
Consequently, the UE remains integrated, but in the SO Lights and/or Heavies are confined to 
one route throughout the range of traffic mix as shown in Figure 1(a). Restriction is beneficial 
because Heavies create much more congestion than do Lights while valuing travel time only 
slightly more. Hence 
L H
H cc • > L • , and it is beneficial to keep Heavies away from Lights. If the 
proportion of Heavies is small, the Heavies are confined to the lower capacity route, Route 2. 
When the proportion of Heavies reaches 41%, all the Heavies are moved onto Route 1, and the 
majority of Lights are shifted onto Route 2. As Figure 1(b) shows, the Pigouvian tolls that 
support the SO take a small downward jump on Route 1 and a small upward jump on Route 2, 
and the toll differentials reverse sign. (The middle columns of Table 2 report the maximum and 
minimum toll differentials for each type over the range  [ ] /0 , H NN ∈ 1
                                                
.) The welfare gain from 
tolling exhibits a double peak (Figure 1(c)) with a local minimum at the point where Lights and 
Heavies switch routes. The two peaks occur with Heavy proportions of 25% and 57% for which 
segregation is optimal (cf. Figure 1(a)), and consequently the benefits of keeping the types apart 
 
15 Naturally, this would not be true if travel demand were elastic. With 20% Heavies in the vehicle mix (a 
representative fraction for urban portions of the US Interstate Highway System) the SO tolls are $4.62 for 
Lights and $13.98 for Heavies: likely high enough to induce diversion of some trips to alternative routes 
or modes. 
  15is greatest. At these points a lane-access rule to segregate the two types is as effective as is 
tolling – as shown by the curve labeled “Segregation” in Figure 1(c). However, segregation is 
beneficial only within a narrow range of traffic mix about each peak, whereas tolling yields 
appreciable benefits over much of the range. Consistent with Proposition 3, restrictions on either 
Lights or Heavies are not effective for any traffic mix. 
 
In Variant 2, the VOT for Heavies is raised 50% above the base-case value to $75/h. The results 
are qualitatively similar to those of Variant 1, but the welfare gain is much higher. Now, 
L H
H cc • < L •  and the primary motivation for separating types is to minimize congestion for Heavies 
by giving them lots of road space. Because of the high VOT for Heavies, the two segregation 
points occur at much lower Heavy proportions than in Variant 1 (14% and 39% vs. 25% and 
57%). 
 
(b) Congestion-cost parameters 
 
For Variant 3, the congestion PCE of Heavies is reduced from 2 to 1.5. The effects of doing so 
are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the effects of raising   in Variant 2. By contrast, 
if the PCE of Heavies is raised from 2 to 3 (Variant 4) the second-order condition is still 
satisfied, and the results remain the same as in the base case. 
H v
 
In Variant 5, parameter 
L
H λ  is doubled from 1 to 2 to capture greater interference of Lights by 
Heavies. This upsets the stability condition, and the UE becomes partially separated or 
segregated as the Lights try to avoid the Heavies.
16 Simultaneously doubling 
L
H λ  and halving   
(Variant 6) has a much more pronounced effect. Significant differences between the UE and SO 
route allocations are apparent (Figure 2(a)) and the tolls on the two routes vary in a rather 
complex way as the traffic mix changes (Figure 2(b)). The welfare gain is substantial (Figure 
2(c)), and segregation is welfare-improving for an appreciable range of traffic mix. However, 
restrictions on either Lights or Heavies alone are still unproductive. 
H v
 
(c) Accident-cost parameters 
 
Doubling the accident externality cost of Heavies (parameter  ) as in Variant 7 does not 
upset the stability condition. But the SO becomes partially separated or segregated. Halving the 
costs of accidents for Heavies does not affect results of interest, but doubling the costs (Variant 
8) has a similar effect to raising the VOT of Heavies as in Variant 2. 
acc PCE
 
In Variant 9, parameter 
L
H φ  is doubled from 1 to 2 to reflect a greater danger to Lights from 
accidents with Heavies. The effect of this change is nearly identical to doubling the costs of 
accidents for Heavies (Variant 8). Surprisingly, doubling 
L
H φ  again from 2 to 4 (Variant 10) 
                                                 
16 As explained in Section 2, if the stability condition is violated and the nonnegativity conditions are 
satisfied (as they are for certain values of the traffic mix), there are two UE. The UE with the lower total 
social costs is assumed to prevail in Variant 5 and the other variants (Variants 6 and 10) in which the 
stability condition fails. This assumption biases downwards the inefficiency of the UE and the potential 
benefits from intervention. 
  16dampens the welfare gain. The reason for this is that the stability condition is now violated, and 
Lights tend to separate themselves from Heavies in the UE – thereby leaving less scope for 
welfare-enhancing intervention. Hence, as is true of the VOT for Heavies, parameter 
L
H φ  has a 
non-monotonic effect on the welfare results. 
 
(d) Route characteristics 
 
For Variants 11 and 12 the two routes are assumed to differ in length, and consequently in free-
flow travel times.
17 As discussed in Section 2, the shorter route is used excessively in the UE, 
and differential route tolls can be levied to correct the bias.
18 As Table 2 indicates, segregation is 
beneficial for a modest range of traffic mix. Interestingly, restricting Lights alone is also 
beneficial in Variant 11 when the proportion of Heavies is relatively large, and restricting 
Heavies is beneficial in Variant 12 when the proportion of Heavies falls in a narrow range. These 
results do not contradict Proposition 4 because Assumptions 1 and 2 of Proposition 2 are 
violated. 
 
Finally, for Variant 13 the two routes are assumed to have equal capacities of 3,000 vehicles/h, 
and the VOT for Heavies is raised to $75/h as in Variant 2.
19 Despite the fact that the total 
capacity of the two routes is the same as in Variant 2, the maximum welfare gain from tolling in 
Variant 13 is about 20% lower. This is because it is efficient to devote the lion’s share of road 
space to the group with the higher travel costs (Heavies here) – an option that is not available if 
the two routes have the same capacities. This illustrates the lesson that the gains from road 
pricing depend not only on the flexibility of tolls, but also on the scope for allocating road space 
between vehicle types in efficient proportions. 
4.2.3  Sensitivity analysis with a given traffic mix 
Figures 1 and 2 display only the effects of varying the traffic mix. To explore the comparative 
static properties of the numerical example further, Figures 3 and 4 show contour diagrams of the 
welfare changes from varying two parameters at once while holding the proportion of Heavies 
fixed at 20%. Figure 3 does so for parameters   and 
H v
L
H λ . A first observation is that the welfare 
gain from intervention is a convex function of   (the value of time for Heavies). This is a 
consequence of the fact that — as noted earlier — the benefits from separation vary with 
H v
L H
HL cc •• − . For low values of  , 
H v
L H
H cc L • • > , and it is beneficial to keep Heavies away from 
Lights. Correspondingly, for large values of  , 
H v
L H
HL cc • • < , and it is advantageous to keep Lights 
away from Heavies. 
 
                                                 
17 Differences in travel time also arise because of differences in speed limits. However, since vehicle 
operating costs and externality costs are assumed to be proportional to distance, these costs change if the 
route lengths change. Differences in speed limits are therefore not equivalent to differences in route 
length that result in the same travel times. 
18 However, the environmental costs of travel are lower on the shorter route, and this dilutes the welfare 
gain from tolling. 
19 If only the capacities are changed the SO remains identical to the UE. 
  17Figure 3 also reveals that the welfare gain is a concave function of 
L
H λ  (the scale factor for truck 
congestion) and reaches a maximum value with 
L
H λ  slightly above one. To see why, note that 
as
L
H λ  rises the cross-congestion-cost coefficient, 
L
H c  , increases and with it the benefit from 
separating Heavies from Lights. But when 
L
H λ  exceeds a threshold value, the unregulated 
equilibrium becomes separated, and the scope for welfare improvement diminishes (although not 
to zero because the unregulated equilibrium route split is not optimal as explained regarding 
Proposition 4). 
 
Figure 4 provides an analogous diagram for parameters   and 
H v
L
H φ  (the scale factor for the 
accident hazard created by trucks). The main difference from Figure 3 is that the highest welfare 
gains accrue for a much higher value of 
L
H φ  than of 
L
H λ . This is because the accident externality 
is much smaller than the congestion externality, so that greater percentage changes in the cross-
accident-cost coefficient are required to have maximum effect. 
 
Figure 5 displays the route allocations in the UE and SO that underlie Figure 4. The picture is 
quite complex — with no less than nine distinct regions. In Regions 1-3 the UE is integrated, in 
Regions 4-6 it is partially separated and in Regions 7-9 it is segregated. For the three regions 
depicted with solid patterns the SO configuration is the same as the UE configuration, and for the 
six regions with shaded patterns the configurations differ. The relative positions of the regions 
are intuitive. Integration in the UE occurs on the left of Figure 3 in Regions 1-3 where 
L
H φ  is 
small. Segregation occurs on the right in Regions 7-9. In Region 1, where 
L
H φ  is small and   
takes on an intermediate value, integration is optimal. And in Regions 3, 5 and 8 where   is 





5  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Truck-only facilities have been promoted as a way to combat road congestion, enhance safety 
and reduce pavement damage. This paper has focused on the first two factors by analyzing how 
light and heavy vehicles choose between traffic lanes or routes and whether the allocation can be 
improved by access regulations or tolling. Several factors were identified as important: the 
relative volumes of Lights and Heavies, the congestion delay and safety hazards that each type of 
vehicle imposes on each type, values of travel time and lane capacity indivisibilities. 
 
One, perhaps unexpected, conclusion is that there is no presumption that Lights and Heavies 
should be segregated. Indeed, with the base-case parameter values the two types are integrated in 
both the unregulated user equilibrium and the system optimum, and neither tolling nor lane-
access rules can improve the outcome. Nevertheless, for many plausible alternative parameter 
values partial separation or segregation is desirable, and it can be achieved using tolls that are 
differentiated by route and vehicle type. In general partial separation or segregation is warranted 
if one type suffers higher costs than it imposes. For example, this is the case for Heavies if 
Heavies have a particularly high value of time or a low PCE for congestion. And it is the case for 
Lights if Heavies impose on Lights either a disproportionately high congestion delay or safety 
hazard. Another finding is that the welfare gains from tolling vary non-monotonically with some 
  18key parameters – including the proportion of heavy vehicles in the traffic mix, the value of time 
for heavy vehicles, and the degree to which light vehicles suffer a disproportionate congestion or 
safety hazard from heavy vehicles. 
 
This paper provides a preliminary and partial analysis of heavy vehicle facilities. A number of 
extensions deserve high priority.  
 
1.  Elastic demand: The numbers of light vehicles and heavy vehicles using the corridor were 
treated as given. With price elastic demand the numbers of vehicles and the vehicle mix 
would be endogenous. In addition to route or lane choices, tolls and access regulations would 
affect trip generation and mode choice decisions. A potential drawback of imposing high tolls 
on truck-only lanes or tollways is that they will induce truckers to use alternative untolled 
corridors that may not be designed to handle heavy vehicles, and that suffer severe 
congestion or accident hazards. 
2.  Trip-timing preferences. As noted in the Introduction, light and heavy vehicles tend to make 
trips at different times of day. Arnott et al. (1992) provide a simple theoretical analysis of 
when temporal segregation is a cost-effective alternative to spatial segregation. To examine 
this question empirically in the case of truck facilities it will be necessary to obtain data on 
trip-timing preferences for light and heavy vehicles. A complicating factor is that accident 
rates tend to vary by time of day and are higher at night (Shefer and Rietveld, 1997). 
3.  Vehicle characteristics: The model features just two vehicle categories. In reality, of course, 
both light vehicles and heavy vehicles differ in numerous characteristics such as size, safety, 
operating costs, emissions and so on, that are relevant to whether they choose to be, or should 
be, integrated or segregated on the road network.
20 
4.  Choice of vehicle type: Vehicle characteristics are exogenous in the model. This is a 
reasonable assumption for analysis of a single travel corridor since most trucking firms 
would have little incentive to modify their vehicle fleets. The assumption sits less well for 
regional or national road networks – particularly since substantial productivity gains may be 
possible from using large combination vehicles (Samuel et al. 2002). Choice of passenger 
vehicle type also depends on perceived safety hazards (Brozović and Ando, 2005). 
5.  Road design: Finally, and perhaps most important, it is desirable to account for the effects of 
building dedicated truck-only facilities on road infrastructure construction and maintenance 
costs. According to Forkenbrock and March (2005) the costs of truck-only lanes depend on 
various factors including right-of-way availability, topography, the need to reconstruct 
overpasses to accommodate heavy vehicles, numbers of entrance and exit ramps required, 
and so on. Consequently, construction cost per lane-km. will have to be assessed on a case-
by-case basis. Truck-only lanes tend to cost more per mile than do car lanes, but by 
concentrating heavy vehicles on part of the road infrastructure they allow the remainder to be 
built and maintained more cheaply. 
 
 
                                                 
20 For example, White (2004) shows that amongst passenger vehicles lights trucks (i.e. Sports Utility 
Vehicles, vans and pickup trucks) impose a much higher danger than do cars to occupants of cars, 
motorcyclists and people using non-motorized forms of transport. Gayer (2004) finds that light trucks are 
2.6 to 4 times as likely than cars to be involved in an accident per year. Accident rates also vary across 
truck types (US DOT, 2006).  
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  227  APPENDIXES 
7.1  Appendix A: An algebraic property of products of sums  
Proposition A1: Let A, B, C, D, a, b, c and d be arbitrary positive numbers and define 
() ( ) ( )( ) Z AaBb CcDd ≡+ + −+ +. 
Assume that 
AB CD =   and  ab cd = .                                                    (A1) 
 
Then Z can be positive, negative or zero. 
 
Proof: Given (A1),  ()
s abC D cd ab cd
ZA b a BC d c D
A BA B CD AB CD





= means identical in sign, and the last equality follows from the first equality in (A1). The 
two equalities in (A1) imply that 
ab cd
ABC D




⎛ +− + ⎜
⎝⎠
⎞
⎟   QED 
 
By making the substitutions  1
L
L A c = ,  2
L
L ac = ,  1
H
H B c = ,  2
H
H bc = ,  1
L
H Cc = ,  2
L
H cc = ,  1
H
L Dc =  and 
2
H
L dc = , it follows from Proposition A1 that the two inequalities in eqn. (6) of the text do not 
assure that the stability condition (5) holds. And by making the substitutions 
L
L A cong • = , 
L
L aa c c • = , 
H
H B cong • = , 
H
H ba c c • = , 
L
H Cc o n g • = , 
L
H ca c c • = , 
H
L D cong • =  and 
H
L da c c • = , it 
follows that inequalities (15a) and (15b) do not assure that stability condition (14) holds. 
7.2   Appendix B: Second-order conditions for a total cost minimum  
A total cost minimum can be achieved by minimizing costs with respect to   and  1 L N 1 H N  subject 
to the constraints   and  21 LL NN N =− L 1 2 H HH NN N = − . The second-order condition for an 

















NN N cc c





⎢⎥ ∂∂ ∂ ⎡ ⎤ + ⎢⎥ = ⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎥ + ∂∂⎣ ⎦ ⎢⎥
∂∂ ∂ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
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L c • > 0
H









LH L H L H
LH HL H L cc cc c c •• • • • • >+− ) .                                             (A2) 
Since the 
g
h c • coefficients are constants (i.e. independent of   and  1 L N 1 H N ) TSC is a globally 
convex function of   and  1 L N 1 H N  if Condition (A2) holds. 
 
7.3  Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 2 
The equal-route-cost conditions for an integrated UE given in eqn. (2) are 
 
12 22 1
12 2 2 1
LL e L L LL
LH L L L H H
HH e H H H H
LH H L L H H
cc N c N c NFF
cc N c N c NFF
••
••
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ++ −




,                                 (A3) 
 
where the superscript “e” denotes the UE. The first-order conditions for an integrated SO given 




22 22 1 2 1
1 22 2 21 21
2 2
2 2
LL H L L LL H o
LL H L H L L LH L L
LH H o LH H HH
HL H H HL L H H HH
cN c c N F F e e cc c N
cc c N cc Nc N FFee
•• •
•• •
1 ⎡ ⎤ ++ + − + − ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ + ⎢ ⎥ = ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ + ⎢ ⎥ ++ + − + − ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
,     (A4) 
 
where the superscript “o” denotes the SO. By Assumptions 1 and 2 of Proposition 2, the fixed 
cost and externality cost terms drop out of eqns. (A3) and (A4). Given Assumption 3 of 
Proposition 2,   for some constant  2 , , , ,
gg
hh cc g L H h L ρ • === H ( ) 0,1 ρ∈ . Eqns. (A3) and (A4) 
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HH e HH
H LH H LH
AA
N cc N cc




⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤
= ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦ 142431 4 2 4 3






LL H o LL H
L LH L L LH L
LH H o LH H
H HL H H HL H
BB
N cc c N cc c
N cc c N cc c
ρ
•• • •• •
•• • •• •
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ ++ ⎡ ⎤
= ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ++ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦ 144424443 144424443
.                     (A6) 
 
By the stability condition (5), Matrix A in (A5) is nonsingular, and by the second-order condition 
(9), Matrix B in (A6) is nonsingular. The UE and SO therefore have a common solution with 
11
eo
L LL NN N ρ ==  and  .  11
eo
HH NN N ρ == H
7.4  Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 3 
The social optimum can be integrated, partially separated or segregated. The three cases are 
considered in turn. 
 
  24(1) Integrated optimum 
 
The equal-route-cost conditions for an integrated UE are given as in eqn. (A3) with toll 
differentials added to the right-hand side: 
 
122 2 1 2 1
12 2 2 1 2 1
LL e L L LL L L
LH L L L H H
HH e H H H HHH
LH H L L H H
cc N c N c NFF
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.                         (A7) 
 
Toll differentials that support the SO can be solved simply by replacing  1
e
L N  and  1
e
H N  in (A7) by 
1
o
L N  and  1
o
H N , and rearranging the equations: 
21 1 2 2 2 1
21 1 2 2 2 1
LL L LL L L L o
LL HH L H L
HH H HH H HH o
LL HH L H H
FFc Nc N cc N





⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ −− − −







Since the SO is integrated, the stability condition is satisfied, and hence the equilibrium with 
tolls is stable. 
 
(2) Partially separated optimum 
 
Without loss of generality suppose Lights use both routes while Heavies are confined to Route 2.  
The number of Lights taking Route 1 in equilibrium is derived by substituting eqn. (1a) into (3a), 




12 2 2 1 2
eL L L L L L L
LL L L H H Ncc N c N F F 1 τ τ
−
• =+ + − + −
2
.                             (A8)                         
 
The SO is derived in the same way except with eqn. (11) for Lights, i.e.  1
L L MSC MSC = , in place 
of eqn. (3a): 
()
1 22 21 21
12 22
LH L L
oL L HL LL
LL L L H
cc F F ee




=+ + + ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ 2
−
 .                     (A9)   
The toll differential for which  11
eo










−= + + .                                (A10) 
 
To deter Heavies from taking Route 1 the toll differential for Heavies must be such that 
. After straightforward calculation one obtains  1





12 2 1 2 2 22
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⎥ .                                           (A11) 
  25The pair of toll differentials given in (A10) and the equality version of (A11) supports the SO if 
the stability condition is satisfied. But if the stability condition fails the solution is unstable. 
Figure A1 illustrates an unstable case in which the reaction curve for Lights, labeled L, is flatter 
than the reaction curve for Heavies, labeled H. Point A where the reaction curves intersect is an 
unstable equilibrium because the direction of adjustment in the north-west sector is away from A. 




H τ τ − , must be increased until the Heavies reaction curve is shifted to H´ where it 
intersects the L reaction curve where  1 0 L N = . 
 
Figure A1: Unstable equilibrium with partial separation 
 
(3) Segregated optimum 
 
Suppose that in the SO Lights are relegated to Route 1 and Heavies to Route 2. The toll 
differentials that deter each type from unilaterally switching to the other route are 
 
21 1 2 1 2
LL L LL L
L LH H FFc Nc N ττ −≥ − + − ,                                     (A12) 
 
12 2 1 2 1
HH H HH H
H HL L F Fc Nc N ττ −≥ − + − .                                   (A13) 
 
The equality variants of these differentials support the system optimum if the stability condition 
is met. But if it is not satisfied the differentials have to be raised. As Figure A2 illustrates, this 
can be done in three ways: (1) by shifting the Lights reaction curve right to L´, (2) by shifting the 
Heavies reaction curve down to H´, or (3) by shifting both curves; e.g. to L´´ and H´´.  
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Figure A2: Unstable equilibrium with segregation 
 
7.5  Appendix E: Explanation for Proposition 4 
Proposition 4 can be proved by calculating TSC in the integrated UE, TSC in any of the four 
possible partially separated UE, and evaluating the difference in costs. To understand Proposition 
4, suppose – following the text – that in the restricted UE, Heavies are confined to Route 2. The 
number of Lights taking Route 1 without tolls is given by eqn. (A8), and the number taking 
Route 1 in the SO is given by (A9). Subtracting (A9) from (A8) gives 
 
() ( ) ( )
1
11 1 21 2 2 2
1
2
eo L L L L H
L LL L L H L NN c FFee cc N
−
• −= − + − + − H .                       (A14) 
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−= − = H ,  
where ρ  is defined as in Appendix C by the equation  .  2 , , , ,
gg
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Sources: 
a Parry (2006, Table 1), 
b Small & Verhoef (2006, Table 3.3), 
c Samuel, Poole and Holguin-Veras (2002, 
Table 4-3), 






Characteristic  Route 1  Route 2 
Capacity  4,000 PCE /hour  2,000 PCE /hour
Speed limit  65 mph 65 mph
Length  32.5 miles 32.5 miles
Demand 
LH NN +   40,000 trips per day 
Proportion of Heavies Range  0-100% 
Volume-independent user costs 
Component  Symbol in model  Light vehicles  Heavy vehicles 













Values of time  g v   $12/hour
d  $50/hour
d 
Congestion cost coefficients 
Component  Symbol in model  Light vehicles  Heavy vehicles 
Light-Light coeff.  L
Lr cong   See text
d 
PCE, Heavies  cong PCE
  2
a 
Relative impedance of 





Accident cost coefficients 
Component  Symbol in model  Light vehicles  Heavy vehicles 
Light-Light coeff.  L
Lr acc   See text
d 
PCE, Heavies  acc PCE   0.75
a 
Relative cost of 
accident for Heavies 
H μ   1
d 
Hazard factor  L
H φ   1
e 
External costs 
Road damage  $0.0000/mile
a $0.0740/mile
a
Local pollution  $0.0133/mile
a $0.0857/mile
a







gr e   $0.0223/mile
a $0.2153/mile
a
Table 1: Base-case parameter values for numerical example Maximum Frac. of Heavies in traffic
Stability Second-order welfare gain mix for which segregation
condition condition Min Max Min Max beneficial (steps of 0.01)
satisfied? satisfied?
Yes Yes $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0 None
1 v
H = $15/h Yes No -$0.81 $0.92 -$1.32 $1.50 $931 [0.23,0.27], [0.55,0.60]
2 v
H = $75/h Yes No -$2.54 $1.86 -$6.01 $4.40 $7,128 [0.11,0.18], [0.33,0.48]
3 PCEcong=1.5 Yes No -$2.53 $1.98 -$4.18 $3.28 $7,275 [0.14,0.24], [0.39,0.56]
4 PCEcong=3 Yes Yes $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0 None
5 λ
L




H = $25/h No No -$1.60 $1.60 -$8.46 $11.37 $6,982 [0.22,0.32], [0.52,0.65]
7 PCEacc=1.5 Yes No -$1.48 $1.12 -$3.29 $2.48 $2,747 [0.14,0.19], [0.39,0.48]
8 μ
H = 2 Yes No -$1.94 $1.46 -$4.12 $3.11 $4,782 [0.13,0.19], [0.37,0.49]
9 φ
L
H=2 Yes No -$1.65 $1.24 -$3.29 $2.48 $4,634 [0.14,0.20], [0.38,0.50]
10 φ
L
H=4 No No -$2.00 $1.54 -$2.39 $1.85 $3,002 [0.13,0.18], [0.38,0.47]
11 Rte 2 length 30 miles Yes No $0.00 $1.43 -$0.08 $3.01 $2,233 [0.15,0.21]











(a)  Value of time for heavy vehicles
[0.20,0.31] No
(b)  Congestion-cost parameters
(c)  Accident-cost parameters
(d)  Route characteristics
13 Yes
 
Table 2: Sensitivity analysis 
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Figure 1: Results for Variant 1:    $15/
H vh =
(a) Fraction of Lights and Heavies on Route 1, (b) Tolls on Lights and Heavies, (c) Welfare gain from 
tolls and from lane access restrictions 
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Figure 2: Results for Variant 6:  2
L
H λ
(a) Fraction of Lights and Heavies on Route 1, (b) Tolls on Lights and Heavies, (c) Welfare gain from 
tolls and from lane access restrictions
= ,    $25/





























Figure 3: Welfare gains from tolling as a function of   and 
H v
L
H λ  with 20% Heavies 































Figure 4: Welfare gains from tolling as a function of   and 
H v
L
H φ  with 20% Heavies 
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Figure 5: Allocation patterns in unregulated equilibrium and social optimum as a function of   and 
H v
L
H φ  with 20% Heavies 
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